I'll summarize our discussion from the ***@gnu.org list.
There are shades of a "bug door" in their no certificates arguments :
- "The only thing edge to manage is a private scalar. No certificates."
- The edge's public key xG is "posted publicly [similar] to a
Certificate Transparency Log [and] "verifiable by all users and so the
deanonymization attack above would not be possible."
In other words, there is no plan for the Tor Project to control any
certificate authorizing the edge's public keys, ala an auditor key in
Taler. Afaik, there are no promises being made about any particular
certificate transparency scheme to keep edges from employing unique
I think their client software could track the public keys they see
themselves easily enough, but if different edge servers use different
keys then this becomes mostly useless. In fact, if the transparency log
posts 256 keys supposedly used concurrently by 256 different edge
servers, but secretly all edge servers used all keys, then your edge
server plus your edge public key gives CF 8 bits of identifying
information, but nothing looks suspicious in the transparency log.
Post by email@example.com
If anyone is inventing a protocol that calls for blinded RSA, I think
they would be far happier using a curve based OPRF.
If you're actually doing money, like we do in Taler, then no you
actually do want RSA blind signatures, not OPRFs plus DLEQ proofs.
These batched DLEQ proofs provide roughly a Schnoor signature for the
withdrawal, so they suffice for many purposes, but..
You loose the blinding when using the DLEQ proof because their hash
incorporates the blinded T. As a result, users must deanonymize
themselves for many activities, like to expose fraud by a merchant, or
show a receipt with fair exchange properties, so all these activities
become privacy minefields with stupidly complex user interfaces. Worse,
you cannot batch the DLEQ proofs like they do lest you deanonymize
multiple transactions, which triples the computational and bandwidth
overhead for OPRFs plus DLEQ proofs.
You loose offline transactions too. We do not require true offline
transaction from a payment system today, and Taler intentionally does
not support them, but.. First, merchants with delayed delivery could
benefit from batching their deposits, so OPRFs make their deposits more
fragile. Second, completely centralized verification for OPRFs turns
merchants into a DoS vector.
In principle, the OPRF described here has extremely secure blinding
because an adversary must compromise both the scalar multiplication and
the hash function that produces the blinding scalar. Against a quantum
adversary, there is likely a slight security regression vs RSA blinding
because the blinding scalar is unlikely to be full domain anymore. In
curve25519, the group order would produce a negligible risk, but against
a quantum adversary the clamping is catastrophic, not sure about P256.
Also, these Schnorr signatures are extremely sensitive to nonce reuse
issues, so you require a good PRNG or else you might reveal your
denomination key through the DLEQ proof. It's fine if you're CF who can
throw serious security at just protecting blogs from SPAM, but it sounds
kinda risky if you want to roll out a payment system in a country
disliked by the NSA or even a refugee camp.